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Sciences of the Flesh is a new chart of old territory. While many critical maps of the 
prehistory and early history of psychoanalysis have been drawn in the past, Dianne 
Sadoff argues that we need one that traces how “shifts in nineteenth-century medical 
and scientific theories of psycho-physical correlation enabled Freud to reinvent, as a 
means of understanding hysteria’s enigmatic symptoms and disordered subjectivities, 
‘plausible bridges’ be- tween  soma and psyche” (p. 4).  Sadoff covers a vast terrain  of 
relevant medical and scientific theories  including  premodern theories  of hysteria, 
nineteenth-century debates  about  the ethics of animal experimentation, rest cures, 
neuropathology, and sexology. In critical readings of scientific writings, she excavates 
theoretical  assumptions  about  the  link between body and mind, and traces the 
emergence  of psychoanalysis as a modern- ist theory of socially determined 
subjectivity. 
The first half of this book lays out shifts from what Sadoff calls “reflex theories” toward 
“representational theories” of the mind-body link or “psycho-physical correlation.” 
Reflex theorists, such as Breuer, imagined the psyche as reducible to neurological 
phenomena such as reflex arcs. Rep- resentational theorists, such as Freud, imagined 
physical phenomena, such as hysterical symptoms, to be linked to the mind through 
representation. However, Sciences of the Flesh is more than an idealist history of the 
philosophy of mind. Drawing on science studies, Sadoff argues that reflex and 
representational theories, like all scientific claims, depend upon social prac- tice. For 
example, she argues that patients’ memories of dreams and child- hood scenes provided 
Freud with the texts he needed to write a representational theory of mind in which 
hysterical symptoms  became theorized  as somatic representations of psychological 
phenomena. Sadoff similarly argues that Freud constructed his representational theory, 
in part, from the practice of teaching hysterical patients to adopt the position of spectator 
on their own constructed memories of childhood scenes. 
Toward the second half of the book, Sadoff argues that Freud  shifted his attention 
away from the female hysteric toward the male homosexual as the central figure of 
psychoanalysis. Again she draws on science studies to argue that Freud’s theory of 
sexuality allowed him to co-opt existing networks of sexologists to transmit 
psychoanalytic theory. She also claims that psychoanalysis was more  successful than  
other  sciences of hysteria precisely because it deployed sexuality to capitalize on these 
networks. Sadoff concludes  that Freud’s own historical accounts of the psychoana- 
lytic movement  attempted to present  psychoanalysis as distinct from the sciences from 
which it emerged by obscuring the historical importance  of his early work on hysteria. 
Although Sciences of the Flesh borrows concepts from several critical theo- rists, it owes 
its greatest theoretical debt to Bruno Latour’s diagnosis of the modern  condition as 
constituted by practices of “translation” and “purification.”1   “Translation” refers to 
practices that create hybrids of nature and culture, such as the translation of knowledge 
along scientific networks. “Purification” is the maintenance of the illusion that such 
hybrids can be easily separated out  into their human  and nonhuman components. For 
Latour, modern  science constructs  very real nature/culture hybrids, such as holes in the 
ozone layer and the AIDS virus, while modern  subjects maintain the illusion that these 
hybrids can ultimately be purified into “natural” and “cultural,” or “real” and 
“constructed” parts. Of course, psychoanalysis is a component of modernity with which 
we, its inhabitants, cannot  but  be familiar. One could  imagine  several interesting  ways 
to  integrate  Latour and Freud; Latour  is, after all, describing the unconscious  of the 
moderns and  suggesting  that  it is more  preoccupied  with hybridity  and  less with 
sexuality than Freud suggested. Sadoff uses Latour to describe how psychoanalysis and 
 related  sciences created  nature/culture hybrids  or  “quasi- objects,” such as highly 
stylized images of female hysterics at the Salpetrière or narrative case histories of 
homosexuals.  Throughout the book  Sadoff faults Freud’s writings and those  of his 
contemporaries and predecessors for “purifying” the hybrids they describe of the work of 
translation that constitutes  them as epistemologically problematic  figures. 
In  the  first three  of the  book’s  seven chapters,  Charcot emerges  as Sadoff ’s 
unlikely hero.  One  of Sadoff ’s goals is to  rehabilitate  Charcot, who she argues has been 
“demonized by twentieth  century critics” (p. 20), such as Lacanians and feminists, for his 
studies on hysteria. Sadoff defends Charcot  against his critics on the grounds  that his 
theory of hysteria contained  the  rudiments  of a representational theory of psycho-
physical correlation and so was not an ordinary disease concept. Sadoff ’s book “avoids a 
feminist program” (p. 17), arguing both that feminists are mistaken to see elements of 
female resistance in hysterical symptomatology and that hysteria is a debilitating   
condition beyond the  explanatory limits  of  social constructivism. She also uses Latour 
to argue that while Charcot’s work was involved in the modernizing work of translation 
and purification,  as such his work is typical of science and so not deserving of particular 
critique. 
I was unconvinced by this use of Latour to defend Charcot, as I was by many of 
Sadoff ’s attempts  to  appropriate  contemporary critical theory. Latour  describes 
translation  and purification  as part of a critique  of mo- dernity, but Sadoff uses these 
concepts to excuse a modernist  project. Drawing on science studies, Sadoff treats 
psychoanalysis and related practices as “sciences” that generate knowledge  in 
“laboratories.” Thus, Charcot’s theatrical demonstrations of hysterical 
symptomatology, Freud’s consulting  room,  and even the pages of Krafft-Ebing’s case 
histories are all theorized  as “laboratories.” However, this analysis blurs a distinction 
that many science studies scholars would draw between the material tech- nologies of 
laboratories and the literary technologies of scientific writing. By focusing on 
psychoanalysis and related practices as sciences, Sadoff ’s text winds up giving scant 
attention to the power relations between phy- sician and patient, and how they might 
be different from those that oper- ate between a natural scientist and a specimen. 
Sadoff ’s map fails to attend to the broader sexual politics within which these scientific 
practices emerged.  She analyzes moral and political claims in sexologists’ writings but 
says little about how political events were in- formed  by sexology. For example,  
homosexual  men  appear  only as the constructed “quasi-objects” of sexologists’ texts, 
and never as authors  of texts who deployed sexology as part of their essentialist political 
strategies for homosexual  rights. Latour is perhaps most valuable for showing how the  
tiny worlds  of laboratories  can shift the  axes of very large debates within a body 
politic. However Sadoff fails to explicate the consequences of translation and 
purification practices in regard to psychoanalysis, sexol- ogy, etc. For critical historians 
who know that knowledge  has something to do with power and who want to know 
about  the human  sciences for that reason, Sciences of the Flesh may prove to be a 
disappointing read. 
In the acknowledgments to this book,  Sadoff describes herself as “an academic, a 
critic, and a Victorianist gone theoretical” (p. viii). However, my dissatisfaction with 
her use of theory was not limited to her appropria- tion of Latour. Sadoff also invokes 
Canguilhem, Foucault, Starr, Haraway, Butler, Grosz, and others when their concepts 
assist her analysis but not when her own analyses go beyond those of other critical 
theorists.  There is a lack of sustained engagement with other theorists,  making it 
difficult for the reader to determine  if Sadoff is saying something  genuinely new 
about this well-worn territory. For example, Sadoff deploys Butler’s 1993 analysis of 
the terms “matter” and “matrix”  to support  her own reading of the sciences of 
hysteria, but  she does not  engage  with Butler’s many deconstructions of Freud’s 
writings. Sadoff borrows Foucault’s term “the logic of sex” for a chapter title and argues 
 that psychoanalysis succeeded as a science precisely because it theorized  a sexual 
etiology for hysteria. How- ever, she does not explain how this argument relates to 
Foucault’s analysis of power in modern  societies as operating  through the  
development of sexual sciences. Rather, she writes off Foucault as a historical 
determinist. For  these  reasons,  it is difficult to  know  exactly what  Sadoff ’s map  of 
psycho-physical correlation in these sciences reveals that previous analyses have 
obscured. 
Sciences of the Flesh is a difficult read. Sadoff ’s chapters jump between very disparate 
scientific and clinical programs, and the thread of her argu- ments about psycho-
physical correlation or the substitution of the homo- sexual for the hysteric becomes  
coherent  only after several careful readings. Consequently, I would not recommend 
Sciences of the Flesh for class- room use; the book is unlikely to pique students’ interest 
in the history of sexuality or the history of psychology. 
 
